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Citizens in rich countries such as the United States and those in the 
European Union have enjoyed two fundamental economic freedoms: 
free movement of goods and movement of people. This has not been the 
case, however, for citizens in many developing countries, where gov-
ernments often impose signifi cant restrictions on internal movements of 
both goods and people. Economists have argued that these restrictions 
create distortions that result in lower income and welfare for the citi-
zens in these countries. Restrictions on free movement of goods shield 
ineffi  cient producers from competition and therefore lower the average 
productivity of fi rms and raise the costs of goods faced by consum-
ers. Restrictions on movement of people prevent workers from seek-
ing more productive opportunities and households from moving to 
high-income regions, which leads to persistent labor misallocation and 
regional income inequality. Removing these restrictions can improve 
citizens’ welfare in these countries by increasing product market com-
petition and reducing labor misallocation, which leads to higher aggre-
gate productivity.
In this chapter I use the period 2000–2005 in China as a case study 
of the benefi ts of reducing restrictions on movements of goods and peo-
ple in an economy. In 2000, China had signifi cant restrictions on inter-
nal trade, as well as severe restrictions on movement of people within 
the country because of a very stringent household registration system 
called hukou. Both restrictions were relaxed between 2000 and 2005. 
China also joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 
2001, which required China to reduce its international trade barriers, 
especially the import barriers.
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During the same period, China’s real GDP grew more than 11 per-
cent per year. How much of the GDP growth can be attributed to the 
reductions in restrictions on movements of goods and people? I will 
provide a quantitative answer to this important question. 
For background, I fi rst discuss the state of the Chinese economy in 
year 2000 and some important changes that happened between 2000 
and 2005. I focus my discussion on three aspects: 1) regional income 
inequality, 2) internal migration, and 3) trade.
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND 
INTERNAL MIGRATION
The cross-province diff erences in real income have been large in 
China. In 2000, the ratio of average real GDP per capita of the top fi ve 
provinces to that of the bottom fi ve was almost 4 to 1. Figure 7.1 plots 
the spatial distribution of real incomes across the Chinese provinces. 
The provinces of the coastal regions in the east generally had substan-
tially higher levels of real income than provinces in the central and 
western regions. 
Despite the large cross-province income diff erences, the percentage 
of workers who moved between provinces was very low because of a 
hukou registration system, which was introduced by the Chinese gov-
ernment in 1958 to control population mobility and urbanization. Under 
this system, each Chinese citizen is assigned a hukou (registration sta-
tus), classifi ed as “agricultural” (rural) or “nonagricultural” (urban) in 
a specifi c administrative unit that is at or lower than the county/city 
level. Approvals from local governments are needed for an individual 
to change the category (agricultural or nonagricultural) or location of 
hukou registration, and it is extremely diffi  cult to obtain such approv-
als. Before the economic reform started in 1978, working outside one’s 
hukou registration location/occupation category was prohibited. This 
prohibition was relaxed in the 1980s, and China started to have migrant 
workers who worked outside their hukou registration locations. How-
ever, prior to 2003 migrant workers were required to apply for a tempo-
rary residence permit, which was diffi  cult to obtain. As a result, many 
migrant workers were without a permit and faced the dire consequence 
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of being arrested and deported by the local authorities. Even with a 
temporary residence permit, migrant workers without local hukou had 
very limited access to local public services and faced much higher costs 
for health care and for their children’s education. As the demand for 
migrant workers in manufacturing, construction, and labor-intensive 
service industries increased, many provinces, especially the coastal 
provinces, eliminated the requirement of a temporary residence per-
mit for migrant workers, and by 2003 all provinces had eliminated the 
requirement. This policy change helped ease migration, but migrant 
workers still face the costs of having only very limited access to local 
public services. More importantly, migrant workers always face these 
costs as long as they do not have local hukou. Because of these costs, 
most migrant workers are young and without children, and their migra-
tion is temporary. In 2000, for example, 70 percent of migrant workers 
were without children, and 70 percent of them moved within the last 
four years. Most of them had agricultural hukou but were working in 
the nonagricultural sector. 
As Table 7.1 shows, in 2000, there were 26.5 million migrant 
workers who worked outside the province of their hukou registration 
provinces. As the restrictions on migrant workers relaxed, the number 








































SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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increased to 49 million in 2005. These are enormous numbers; however, 
they only represent 4.2 and 7.2 percent of China’s total employment in 
2000 and 2005, respectively. The majority of migrant workers in China 
are those who move within a province. The numbers of within-province 
migrant workers were around 90 million in 2000 and 120 million in 
2005, representing 14.3 and 17.7 percent of China’s total employment 
in 2000 and 2005, respectively.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRADE
It has been well documented that internal trade costs in China 
in the 1990s were high (Poncet 2005; Young 2000). It has also been 
documented that the degree of local market protection in a province 
was directly related to the size of the state sector in that province (Bai 
et al. 2004). Since 2000, these trade barriers have been reduced sig-
nifi cantly. Some of the reduction was a result of the deliberate policy 
reforms undertaken by the government. For example, the state coun-
cil under the then premier Zhu Rongji issued a directive in 2001 that 
prohibits local government from engaging in local market protections. 
More importantly, as a result of various state-owned enterprise reforms, 
the size of the state sector has declined signifi cantly and consequently 
lowered local government incentives to engage in local market protec-
tions. Improved transport infrastructure and logistics also helped lower 
internal trade cost.
Table 7.1  Stock of Migrant Workers in China
Interprovincial Intraprovincial
2000 2005 2000 2005
Total stock (millions) 26.5 49.0 90.1 120.4
Share of total employment (%) 4.2 7.2 14.3 17.7
NOTE: Migrants are defi ned based on their hukou registration location. Interprovincial 
migrants are workers registered in another province from where they are employed. 
Intraprovincial migrants are workers registered in the same province where they are 
employed, but are either nonagricultural workers holding agricultural hukou or vice 
versa.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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The province-level trade data, both between province pairs and 
internationally, are taken from the regional input-output tables for 2002 
and 2007. Table 7.2 reports the aggregate bilateral fl ows between the 
eight regions and each other and the rest of the world. To ease compari-
sons, we normalize all fl ows by the importing region’s total expendi-
tures. In addition to the bilateral trade fl ows, we also report in the last 
column the share of a region’s expenditures that are spent on goods 
from all other regions within China. A useful measure of a region’s 
trade openness is the fraction of its expenditures allocated to its own 
producers—that is, its “home share.” The diagonal elements in Table 
7.2 provide these values for each region. Interior regions of China have 
a much higher home share than coastal regions. In 2002, the central 
region’s home share is 0.88 compared to only 0.72 for the south coast 
and 0.63 for Beijing and Tianjin.
While regions in China generally import more from abroad than from 
any particular region within China, the total imports from the rest of 
China are still higher than imports from abroad for most of the regions. 
The Central Coast and South Coast regions are the exceptions. In 2002, 
their imports from abroad were signifi cantly higher than imports from 
the rest of China; they also had substantial international exports.
TRADE AND MIGRATION COSTS IN CHINA
Tombe and Zhu (2015) use a structural model combined with the 
data on trade and migration fl ows to estimate costs of trade and migra-
tion. The model generates gravity equations that relate the trade fl ow 
between two regions to the real GDP of the two regions and the trade 
cost between the two regions, and the migration fl ow between two 
regions to the real incomes of the two regions and the cost of migration 
between two regions.
 Trade fl ow between regions A and B = F(GDP of region A, GDP of 
region B, distance, trade cost)
Migration fl ow from regions A to B = G(income of region A, income of 
region B, distance, migration cost)
















Northeast 87.9 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.9 5.5 6.6
Beijing/Tianjin 3.9 63.4 9.4 3.0 2.6 3.3 1.4 1.2 11.9 24.8
North Coast 1.8 3.3 79.8 3.4 1.8 3.8 0.9 0.8 4.4 15.8
Central Coast 0.2 0.2 0.6 81.0 1.5 2.4 0.5 0.5 13.3 5.7
South Coast 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.6 72.3 1.9 0.4 1.5 19.8 7.9
Central Region 0.6 0.3 1.1 4.8 2.3 87.8 0.7 0.7 1.8 10.4
Northwest 2.0 0.8 2.1 3.3 4.5 3.6 77.4 3.8 2.6 20.0
Southwest 0.9 0.3 0.4 1.8 4.3 1.4 0.9 88.0 2.0 10.0
Abroad 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 –
Year 2007
Northeast 78.7 2.0 2.0 0.9 2.7 1.0 1.4 0.9 10.4 10.9
Beijing/Tianjin 3.8 62.3 10.1 1.5 2.4 1.8 2.1 0.7 15.5 22.2
North Coast 2.1 5.8 76.8 1.5 1.5 3.7 2.3 0.8 5.5 17.7
Central Coast 1.1 0.7 1.4 76.8 1.8 4.8 1.7 0.9 10.8 12.4
South Coast 1.5 0.9 1.7 5.2 68.5 3.6 1.8 2.8 14.1 17.4
Central Region 1.7 1.4 4.5 4.9 4.0 73.0 2.9 1.8 5.9 21.1
Northwest 2.3 2.2 4.8 2.7 5.5 3.6 65.6 3.6 9.8 24.6
Southwest 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.7 8.4 1.9 3.2 73.8 6.6 19.6
Abroad 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.1 –
NOTE: The table displays the share of each importing region’s total spending allocated to each source region. See Tombe and Zhu (2015, 
Appendix A) for the mapping of provinces to regions. The column “Total other prov.” reports the total spending share of each importing 
region allocated to producers in other provinces of China. The diagonal elements (the “home share” of spending”), the share imported 
from abroad, and the share imported from other provinces will together sum to 100%.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 7.2  Internal and External Trade Shares of China
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With data on GDP, income, distance, and trade and migration fl ows, 
the trade and migration costs can be estimated as residuals.
Migration Costs
We measure the migration cost as a factor that defl ates a migrant’s 
real income so that she is indiff erent between migrating or staying in 
her hukou location. The cost may vary across the sector-location pairs. 
For example, if the cost of migrating to a destination is 3, then an indi-
vidual will migrate to the destination if and only if the real income in 
the destination is at least three times as high as the real income the 
individual can earn by staying at her hukou location. We summarize 
these costs, their changes, and the initial migration fl ows in Table 7.3. 
Overall, migration costs are largest for migrants switching both sectors 
and provinces, with an average initial cost of nearly 38. In contrast, 
switching sectors within one’s home province incurs average migration 
costs of 2.9. When estimating the migration costs by migrant work-
er’s age, the costs are much higher for older workers. These patterns 
of migration costs are consistent with our discussion earlier that the 
most important source of the migration costs is the lack of access to 
local public services at the migration destination. This is clearly more 
important for older migrant workers and workers who are farther away 
from their hukou location. 
Table 7.3 also reports the change in average migration costs between 
2000 and 2005 in the last column. Overall, migration costs declined to 
84 percent of their initial level. Costs to switch provinces fell the most, 
from 32.6 to 19.8. Sectoral switches within a worker’s home region also 
fell, from 2.9 to 2.4.
Trade Costs
The trade cost we estimate is a comprehensive measure of barriers 
to trade that includes tariff s, transportation costs, and other nontariff  
barriers, such as local protection policies. It is represented as an iceberg 
cost. For example, if the export cost is 3, then for one unit of good 
to reach the export destination, it will cost the exporter three units of 
goods. For a typical province in China in 2002, the average trade cost 
was 3 in agriculture and 2 in nonagriculture, and the magnitudes of 
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internal and external trade costs are similar. So, trade costs were quite 
high in 2002. Overall, we fi nd that poor regions face the highest export 
costs—consistent with existing cross-country evidence. 
Table 7.4 presents the relative change in the nonagricultural trade 
costs for eight regions in China between 2002 and 2007. Some notable 
patterns emerge. Within China, trade costs were largely decreasing, 
with trade-weighted change in trade costs within China of −11 percent. 
For trade between China and the world, the average change in trade 
costs was −8 percent. Poor regions such as Central, Northwest, and 
Southwest experienced much larger reductions in export costs than rich 
regions did. Also, the reductions in China’s costs of importing from the 
rest of the world were much larger than the reductions in China’s costs 
of exporting to the rest of the world. These numbers suggest that around 
the time when China joined the WTO, there were signifi cant reductions 
in China’s internal trade costs and import costs and only modest reduc-
tions in China’s export costs.
Table 7.3  Migration Rates and Average Costs, by Sector and Province
Migration costs








Agriculture to nonagriculture 
migration cost changes
Overall 0.16 3.4 2.9 0.84
Within province 0.13 2.9 2.4 0.84
Between province 0.03 37.8 23.2 0.61
Between provinces migration 
cost changes
Overall 0.04 32.6 19.8 0.61
Within agriculture 0.003 71.9 63.7 0.89
Within nonagriculture 0.01 21.3 12.4 0.58
Overall 0.174 3.6 3.0 0.84
NOTE: Displays migration-weighted harmonic means of migration costs in 2000 and 
2005. We use initial (year 2000) weights to average the 2005 costs to ensure the dis-
played change refl ects changes in costs and not migration patterns.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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THE EFFECT OF MEASURED COSTS CHANGES
In Tombe and Zhu (2015) we use a general equilibrium model to 
quantify the eff ect of the changes in trade and migration costs. In the 
quantitative analysis, we fi t the initial equilibrium of our model to the 
Chinese data in 2002 and then quantify the impacts on aggregate pro-
ductivity and welfare of various changes in trade and migration costs. I 
summarize the main results here.
The Eff ect of Lower Trade Costs
Table 7.5 displays the change in trade and migration fl ows, aggre-
gate productivity, and welfare, and various other outcomes as a result 
of the changes in trade costs. Changes in trade shares are expenditure-
weighted average changes across all provinces and sectors. Lower inter-
nal trade costs, not surprisingly, decrease the amount of international 
trade as households and fi rms reorient their purchase decisions toward 
domestic suppliers. The share of expenditures allocated to producers in 
another province typically increases by over 9 percentage points, while 
the share allocated to international producers falls by almost 1 percent-
age point. Lower external trade costs reveal the opposite pattern. In 



















Northeast −11.8 −16.7 −23.5 −24.7 −23.0 −18.0 −18.5 −27.7
Beijing/Tianjin −14.2 −15.0 −15.5 −13.8 −23.9 −25.7 −18.5 −26.9
North Coast −5.7 −1.0 −1.0 −11.2 −20.7 −22.6 −20.7 −20.3
Central Coast −16.4 −5.2 −4.5 −11.2 −15.9 −17.9 −12.4 −19.1
South Coast −18.4 −4.0 −15.1 −12.0 −20.7 −24.7 −20.8 −10.6
Central Region −6.6 −5.2 −15.1 −6.7 −11.2 −19.1 −16.8 −27.9
Northwest −4.0 −10.6 −20.0 −12.0 −18.6 −21.9 −17.8 −37.8
Southwest −3.8 −1.2 −17.5 −5.4 −13.8 −19.1 −17.2 −27.7
World −3.8 −0.2 −6.5 −1.6 9.7 −21.0 −29.4 −18.5
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 7.4  Percent Change in Trade Costs, 2002–2007
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In terms of migration, improved internal trade costs actually resulted 
in fewer workers living outside their home province. The total stock of 
migrants declined by over 2 percent (equivalent to approximately 0.5 
million workers). Intuitively, declining internal trade costs dispropor-
tionately lower goods prices in poor, interior regions. This increase in 
real income means that fewer workers living in other provinces were 
willing to continue to do so. On the other hand, a greater fraction of 
workers switched sectors within their home province. With lower inter-
national trade costs, richer coastal regions disproportionately benefi t, 
so more workers relocate there in addition to more workers switching 
sectors within their home province.
The change in income, goods and land prices, and workers’ loca-
tion decisions all have implications for aggregate welfare. We report the 
change in welfare and productivity (aggregate real GDP) in the last col-
umns of Table 7.5. In response to lower internal trade costs, aggregate 
welfare dramatically increased by nearly 11 percent. In contrast, exter-
nal trade cost reductions resulted in a much smaller gain of only 3.1 per-
cent. As in our earlier analysis, internal trade costs reductions appear to 
be signifi cantly more important for aggregate outcomes. The diff eren-
tial impacts are not due to any signifi cant diff erences in the magnitude 
of cost reductions. The main reason for the larger welfare gains from 
internal cost reductions is that most provinces allocate a larger fraction 
of their spending to goods from other provinces than from abroad.
Table 7.5  Eff ects of Trade Cost Changes
Percentage point 













Internal trade 9.2 −0.7 0.8 −2.0 10.7 10.7
External trade −0.7 3.9 1.8 2.4 3.8 2.6
All trade 8.2 2.9 2.5 0.3 14.4 13.2
NOTE: Displays aggregate response to various trade cost changes. All use trade cost 
changes as measured. The migrant stock is the number of workers living outside their 
hukou registration location or sector.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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The Eff ect of Lower Migration Costs
Trade liberalization accounts for only a limited amount of migra-
tion. Not surprisingly, lower migration costs lead to substantially more 
workers living outside their home province-sector. As before, we simu-
late the eff ect of lower migration cost changes and report the eff ects in 
Table 7.6.
The stock of migrants increases dramatically when the cost of 
migration declines as measured. The number of interprovincial migrants 
increases by more than 80 percent. Within provinces, there are also sub-
stantial moves from agriculture to nonagriculture. The stock of workers 
with agricultural hukou that have nonagricultural employment within 
their home province increases by nearly 15 percent. Clearly, the mea-
sured changes in migration costs are extremely important determinants 
of worker location decisions. The large fl ows are also benefi cial for 
China as a whole; real GDP and welfare rise 4.8 and 8.5 percent, respec-
tively. Changes that facilitate the movement of workers from agricul-
ture to nonagriculture sectors, whether within or between provinces, 
account for most of the increases in aggregate GDP and welfare. 
While migration fl ows and real incomes respond greatly to the 
changes in migration costs, the eff ect on aggregate trade fl ows is muted. 
International and internal trade shares increase by only 0.2 and 0.1 per-
centage points, respectively.
Table 7.6  Eff ects of Various Migration Cost Changes
Percentage 

















All 0.1 0.2 14.5 82.4 4.8 8.5
Agriculture to nonagriculture migration cost changes
Overall 0.1 0.1 15.3 54.0 4.4 7.2
Within province 0.0 −0.1 22.8 −9.6 2.0 4.8
Between province 0.1 0.2 −7.0 71.0 2.9 2.7
NOTE: Displays aggregate response to various migration cost changes. All use migra-
tion cost changes as measured. The migrant stock is the number of workers living 
outside their hook registration location or sector.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Decomposing China’s Growth between 2000 and 2005
While the results above show that the reductions in trade and migra-
tion costs have a large eff ect on the aggregate GDP growth, they cannot 
account for all the observed growth in China between 2000 and 2005. 
Other factors, such as technology improvements and reforms within 
each province and sector may also contribute to the aggregate GDP 
growth during that period. In Tombe and Zhu (2015), we summarize 
the contribution of these factors by a residual productivity growth term 
for each province and sector so that the combination of the productiv-
ity growth and the measured changes in trade and migration costs can 
generate a GDP growth rate in our quantitative model that matches the 
actual GDP growth rate in that province and sector. By construction, 
the quantitative model with the measured cost changes and the implied 
residual productivity growth also matches the aggregate GDP growth 
exactly. The model can then be used to decompose China’s overall 
growth into one of four components: productivity growth, lower internal 
trade costs, lower international trade costs, and lower internal migration 
costs. The result of the decomposition is reported in Table 7.7.
Overall, reductions in trade and migration frictions account for 
about one-third of China’s overall growth. Reductions in internal trade 
and migration costs contribute roughly one quarter (15.3 percent of 
the 57.1 percent). In stark contrast, international trade cost reductions 
account for only 7 percent of the overall growth (4.2 percent of the 57.1 
percent).
Potential Gains from Further Reform
Our decomposition shows that reductions in trade and migration 
frictions and the resulting reduction in misallocation of labor played a 
major role in China’s growth between 2000 and 2005. How much addi-
tional scope is there for further reductions in trade and migration costs? 
In Tombe and Zhu (2015), we use the quantitative model to evaluate 
the eff ect of two potential reforms: 1) lowering the internal trade costs 
to the average level observed in Canada, and 2) lowering the internal 
migration costs so that the average interprovincial migration rate in 
China is the same as the interstate migration rate in the United States. 
The results are reported in Table 7.8 and show that China’s real GDP 
and welfare could increase by a further 10.9 percent and 11.8 percent 
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if average internal trade costs fell to Canada’s level, and an additional 
22.8 percent and 15 percent if the average migration rate in China was 
the same as that in the United States. The scope for and gains from 
further policy reforms are therefore large. Both changes together would 
deliver real GDP gains of 37 percent and welfare gains of nearly 31 
percent.
CONCLUSION
China experienced rapid GDP growth between 2000 and 2005, and 
many believe it is because of the external trade liberalization associ-
Table 7.7  Decomposing China’s Overall Real GDP Growth
Marginal eff ects
Real GDP growth (%) Share of growth
Overall (all changes) 57.1 —
Productivity changes 37.9 0.66
Internal trade cost changes 9.7 0.17
External trade cost changes 4.2 0.07
Migration cost changes 5.6 0.10
NOTE: Decomposes the change in real GDP into contribution from productivity, inter-
nal trade cost changes, external trade cost changes, and migration cost changes.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.






Average internal trade costs as in Canada 10.9 11.8
Between-province migration as in U.S. 22.8 15.0
Both changes together 37.0 30.5
NOTE: Reports the change in real GDP and welfare that result from changing China’s 
internal trade and migration costs such that average internal costs equal Canada’s (by 
sector) or such that the between-province migration fl ows match the U.S. Percentage 
changes are expressed relative to the Chinese economy in 2005.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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ated with China’s joining the WTO in 2001. This resulted in export 
expansion supported by a large increase in the supply of cheap migrant 
workers, hence the growth. Internal policy reforms undertaken by the 
Chinese government during the same period have not received as much 
attention. However, their contribution to China’s growth during that 
period is much more important than the contribution of the external 
trade liberalization. Reductions in internal trade and migration costs 
account for 27 percent of the aggregate GDP growth in China between 
2000 and 2005. In contrast, reductions in external trade costs account 
for only 7 percent of the aggregate GDP growth during the same period. 
Despite the reductions, internal trade and migration costs in China are 
still much higher than those in developed countries such as Canada and 
the United States. Further reforms that lower these costs to developed 
country levels could yield substantial increases in China’s aggregate 
GDP and welfare in the future.
Note
This chapter is largely based on my joint paper with Trevor Tombe (Tombe and 
Zhu 2015). I thank the Department of Economics at Western Michigan University for 
inviting me to present this paper at the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series.
The data on regional income are constructed based on the GDP and employment 
series provided by Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013); the data on trade are from the Inter-
Province Input-Output table provided by Li (2010) and the Inter-Regional Input-Output 
table provided by Zhang and Qi (2012); and the data on migration are from the 1 per-
cent sample of the 2000 China Population Census and the 20 percent sample of the 
China 2005 1 Percent Population Survey.
There is no regional input-output table for 2000 in China, so we use trade shares 
from the 2002 China Regional Input-Output Tables to approximate trade shares in 2000.
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